Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2018

Debating the Past's Authority in Alabama
Sara Mayeux

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sara Mayeux, Debating the Past's Authority in Alabama, 70 Stanford Law Review. 1645 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/897

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Stanford Law Review
Volume 70

May 2018

REFLECTION

Debating the Past’s Authority in Alabama
Sara Mayeux*
In 2015, the city council of Birmingham, Alabama enacted an ordinance
establishing a local minimum wage of $10.10 an hour—a significant raise for
the city’s low-income workers from the federal floor of $7.25.1 The ordinance
proved short-lived. Within months, the Alabama legislature had passed and the
governor signed statewide preemption legislation nullifying all local wage
regulations. Marnika Lewis, a twenty-three-year-old mother and employee of
the Moe’s Southwest Grill burrito chain, is among several plaintiffs
challenging the Alabama preemption statute, HB 174, as unconstitutional and
racially discriminatory.2 “[T]he legislature and the governor,” Lewis complains,
have “stolen my raise.”3
Lewis’s legal claims rest upon a deeper set of claims about Alabama history.
In the plaintiffs’ account, HB 174 represents the latest iteration of a recurring
pattern in which every time local black majorities assert political or economic
power, Alabama’s statewide white power structure reacts with hostility. The
facts supporting this account include the following: After decades of white
flight to its suburbs, the city of Birmingham is 73% black.4 Its city council is
almost entirely black, and its population of low-wage workers disproportion-

* Assistant Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University; J.D., Ph.D., Stanford
University. Thank you to Bob Gordon, of course, for furnishing the occasion; to the
organizers and to everyone who participated in Bobfest for a memorable weekend; to
Ariela Gross for coordinating this forum and for editorial suggestions; and to the Stanford
Law Review staff for their keen editing.
1. See Jana Kasperkevic, “The State Stole My Raise”: Workers Sue Alabama over “Racist” Wage
Law, GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/J6T2-RPGG.
2. See Scott Douglas, Birmingham’s Fight for a Living Wage, DISSENT (Summer 2017),
https://perma.cc/KGF7-FLVQ; Kasperkevic, supra note 1; see also H.R. 174, 2016 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016) (enacted) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 25-7-40 to -45 (2018)).
3. See Kasperkevic, supra note 1.
4. Amended Complaint ¶ 31, Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-cv-00690-RDP, 2017 WL 432464
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Lewis Complaint].
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ately black.5 Conversely, the state governor is white, the state legislature
predominantly white, and the statewide population about 69% white.6 In both
houses of the state legislature, the vote on HB 174 proceeded along almost
exactly partisan and largely racial lines.7 Every black legislator opposed it.8
Alabama’s state constitution—adopted in 1901—authorizes state-level overrides
of local policymaking in a variety of contexts precisely because its Jim Crowera framers feared empowering black local majorities.9
The countervailing account, offered by the state in defending HB 174 and
accepted by the federal district judge who dismissed the complaint, does not
deny Alabama’s history of white supremacy but defines that history as
irrelevant to this more recent episode of “run-of-the-mill” economic
policymaking.10 On this account, the Birmingham ordinance exposed a
heretofore unrecognized gap in Alabama law, a gap that required quick
mending in order to “maintain stability in the State’s business climate.”11 It was
purely incidental that the state legislature happened to be mostly white and the
Birmingham city council mostly black. In its motion to dismiss, the state
explained that HB 174 could not constitute a vestige of Jim Crow because the
dictionary defines a “vestige” as “a remaining bit . . . of something formerly
present,” whereas this legislation “was enacted in 2016, modeled after other
5. Id. at ¶¶ 30, 102; see also Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 4, Lewis v. Alabama,

No. 17-11009 (11th Cir. June 5, 2017), 2017 WL 2463105.
6. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Ala., Kay Ivey Sworn In as Governor

7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

(Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZS25-Q537 (governor); Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, Legislators’ Race and Ethnicity 2015, at 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/RHH4
-SUKA (legislature); QuickFacts: Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc
/8D3W-VF5D (archived Apr. 8, 2018) (population).
See Lewis Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 22-23, 26. Of those who cast a vote on HB 174, all
but two Republicans voted in favor and all but one Democrat voted against. See Roll
Call: Alabama House Bill 174; House Motion to Read a Third Time and Pass, LEGISCAN,
https://perma.cc/78H5-V78T (archived Apr. 8, 2018); Roll Call: Alabama House Bill 174;
Senate Motion to Read a Third Time and Pass, LEGISCAN, https://perma.cc/QRZ3-AQ8U
(archived Apr. 8, 2018).
See Lewis Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 23, 26.
See id. ¶¶ 66-68; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Historians Susan Ashmore et al. in
Support of Appellants Seeking Reversal at 4, 7-9, 12, Lewis, No. 17-11009 (11th Cir.
June 12, 2017), 2017 WL 2671578 [hereinafter Lewis Historians’ Brief]; Lewis Complaint,
supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that HB 174 “perpetuates an official policy of political white
supremacy that has been maintained in Alabama since it became a state in 1819”).
See State of Alabama and Attorney General Strange’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (Doc. 18) & Initial Submission in Response to Exhibit B of the Court’s Order
at 4, Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-cv-690-RDP, 2017 WL 432464 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017),
2016 WL 7365664 [hereinafter Lewis Motion to Dismiss]; see also Lewis, 2017 WL
432464, at *1 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ portrayal of “this dispute as yet another chapter in
Alabama’s civil rights journey”).
See Lewis Motion to Dismiss, supra note 10, at 2-4.
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States’ laws, endorsed in judicial opinions, and supported by social-science
findings.”12
That a dispute about Alabama labor law could transform into a dispute
about how heavily to weigh the burdens of Alabama history exemplifies one of
Bob Gordon’s central insights: the recurrent tendency of American lawyers to
appeal to the past as both “authority” and “social critic.”13 In recent years,
increasingly convoluted and self-referential debates about originalism have
dominated the scholarly conversation about the relationship between history
and law. But as Gordon has long recognized, explicit exegesis of past texts and
practices is neither the only nor necessarily the most consequential way in
which history informs legal argument. Lawyers and jurists are constantly
making more diffuse appeals to the past’s authority, draping their legal claims
around the scaffolding of imagined metanarratives about how history unfolds
and the place of lawyers and jurists within that unfolding. History is everpresent within the law, Gordon writes, in the form of “mostly implicit, takenfor-granted assumptions about the relation of the present to the past, about
what is or should be permanent or unchanging, and about how we have
changed and the general directions of change.”14
In a series of lectures given in the 1990s and now brought together in
Taming the Past, Gordon offered a perceptive taxonomy of these implicit
assumptions.15 In the nineteenth century and in much of the twentieth
century, most American lawyers operated within what Gordon labeled the
“liberal progress” account of U.S. history, in which the polity progressively
included more people and those people enjoyed progressively greater liberties
and material blessings.16 For nineteenth century liberals, progress took the
form of releasing commercial energy, developing the continent, and replacing
slavery with free labor.17 Their twentieth century descendants appended the
12. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Vestige, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (2002)).
13. See ROBERT W. GORDON, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and

14.
15.

16.
17.

Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW
IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 282, 282 (2017) (capitalization altered).
ROBERT W. GORDON, Introduction to TAMING THE PAST, supra note 13, at 1, 10.
See GORDON, supra note 13, at 282 (explaining that the essay is a revised version of a
1990 presentation at a conference hosted by the Program in Comparative Study in
Social Transformation at the University of Michigan, first published in 1996); ROBERT
W. GORDON, Taming the Past: Histories of Liberal Society in American Legal Thought, in
TAMING THE PAST, supra note 13, at 317 [hereinafter GORDON, Histories of Liberal Society]
(revised version of the 1993 Thomas M. Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan
Law School).
See GORDON, supra note 13, at 290 (capitalization altered); see also GORDON, Histories of
Liberal Society, supra note 15, at 317, 322-26, 335.
See GORDON, supra note 13, at 290-91.
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New Deal onto this timeline as well as the civil rights and gender equality gains
of the 1960s and 1970s.18 Until the Reagan Revolution (more or less), this
dominant progress narrative retained essentially a centrist-liberal valence and
a basic optimism. Welfare and regulatory programs constituted beneficial
adaptations, updating the meaning of liberty for modern industrial conditions.
Gains, once made, tended to endure; programs, once in place, to entrench
themselves. The project of lawyers and jurists, then, was to facilitate the
ongoing process of gradually expanding the political circle and the meaning of
liberty.
Critics from both the radical left and the neotraditionalist right counterposed more pessimistic metanarratives. Especially interesting for purposes of
this Reflection is what Gordon called the “radical challenge” from the left, a
gloomy epic of U.S. history in which the oppressed achieved no permanent
gains but suffered a relentless cycle of “progress thwarted” and “promises
betrayed.”19 Legislative achievements were subsequently nullified, judicial
victories weakly enforced. This interpretation posited “no reliable trend
toward ever increasing pluralism,” only “periods of struggle . . . , often followed
by periods of intense reaction, sometimes xenophobic and hysterical,
sometimes quite nicely calculated by established powers.”20 What salutary role
lawyers and judges might play in such a story was unclear, which may explain
why—as of 1996—Gordon assessed the radical critique, though it was
transformative within the academy, as having had “relatively little influence”
on practicing lawyers.21
Today, legal liberals seem more influenced by the radical critique than they
were when Gordon developed his taxonomy. In their rhetoric, they now often
seem to have abandoned their own foundational metanarrative of progress, at
least in its most optimistic varieties. In its place, they have fused a more modest
teleological vision with elements of the radical dialectic among oppression,
tenuous gains, and backsliding. When progressives invoke history in legal
argument, their accounts less often revolve around an implicit Whiggishness
and instead resemble a religious story in which the United States struggles
constantly with the temptation to racial injustice that derives from the original
sin of the founding compromise with slavery. Though the country has
occasionally transcended that sin, it remains in constant danger of regressing.
The task for lawyers and judges, then, is to remain vigilant, sounding the alarm
at the first signs of a new round of threats and shoring up the beach as much as
possible against the tides of reaction.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See GORDON, Histories of Liberal Society, supra note 15, at 331-35.
See GORDON, supra note 13, at 293 (capitalization altered).
See id. at 296.
See id. at 293; see also GORDON, Histories of Liberal Society, supra note 15, at 336.
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A historians’ amicus brief recently filed in the Alabama litigation illustrates this dynamic, warning that the district court erred because it ignored the
perilous continuities between HB 174 and Alabama’s “long history of
restructuring government powers to deny decisionmaking authority to local
black majorities.”22 Another example is the amicus brief filed by Representative John Lewis with the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder, which,
in urging the Court to leave intact the challenged provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, was structured explicitly around the argument that it is
dangerous to believe in inevitable progress.23 Lewis’s “great-great-grandfather
freely voted during Reconstruction,” the brief explained, and yet look what
Lewis had to do a hundred years later to (re)gain the right to vote.24 Progress,
then, must not be assumed as “the natural trajectory of emancipation”;
democracy depends upon “continued vigilance.”25 The dissenting Justices in
Shelby County adopted elements of this liberal-radical fusion metanarrative, as
encapsulated in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s memorable line that
invalidating the challenged components of the Voting Rights Act—despite the
documented threat of “retrogression” back to racial discrimination—was “like
throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting
wet.”26
In the realm of civil rights, it is now conservative jurists who more
frequently appeal to metanarratives of progress. They accept that the great
civil rights statutes of the 1960s might have been necessary once, and even—
matching the most fervent Whig’s faith in legislative potential to remake
society, and quite at odds with the more typical conservative agnosticism about
that potential—celebrate these statutes for having largely achieved their aims.
For example, in Shelby County, it was Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority
opinion that offered the closest thing to a full-throated progress narrative.
Since 1965, in Chief Justice Roberts’s summary, “things have changed
dramatically” in Alabama; quoting congressional findings, he touted
“[s]ignificant progress . . . in eliminating . . . barriers experienced by minority
22. See Lewis Historians’ Brief, supra note 9, at 6 (capitalization altered).
23. See Brief for the Honorable Congressman John Lewis as Amicus Curiae in Support of

Respondents and Intervenor-Respondents at 3-4, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 476051 [hereinafter Shelby County Lewis Brief]
(emphasizing “the danger of [the] claim of ever-forward progress” in the voting
context); id. at 5 (arguing that the history of voting rights is one of “recurring
retrenchment,” not “continuous progress” (capitalization altered)). For a more detailed
discussion of this brief, see Sara Mayeux, Litigating the Line Between Past and Present,
BUNK (Sept. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/73T7-X7ZG.
24. Shelby County Lewis Brief, supra note 23, at 8 (capitalization altered).
25. See id. at 11, 13 (capitalization altered).
26. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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voters.”27 “There is no doubt,” Chief Justice Roberts continued, “that these
improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act,” which “has
proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and
integrating the voting process.”28 It was as if the Voting Rights Act were not
merely a well-engineered umbrella but had put an end to rain.
So we have arrived at an odd legal moment in which—at least for some
purposes—the lawyers and jurists eager to blithely move on from history are
the conservatives, and the lawyers and jurists staggering under the weight of
the past are the liberals. Certainly, it is possible to hazard some guesses about
what’s driving this rhetorical reshuffling. The new liberal pessimism mirrors
the current balance of political strength. At both the federal level and, in much
of the country, the state level, the political right controls the levers of
policymaking. With some exceptions, the major project of civil rights
litigators today is not forward movement but the work of preserving as much
as possible the gains of the 1960s against legal and political battering.29
Meanwhile, and ironically, the rise of conservative progress metanarratives
reflects the achievement of both liberal and radical scholars of forcing into
mainstream discourse greater recognition of the evils of slavery and Jim Crow.
Respectable conservatives now join in denouncing the most flagrant forms of
racial terror running through the American past (pace certain allies of the
Trump Administration). But doing so places them in a bind, for they also
generally reject arguments that today’s distribution of material blessings and
life chances derives from past racial injustice in ways the law is bound or even
permitted to worry about. To shimmy out of this bind, at least in the narrow
realm of civil rights litigation, conservatives appeal not to their otherwise
beloved past but instead to their own variation on twentieth century liberals’
faith in the future.
Yet there is inevitably something a bit off-kilter about conservative
progress narratives. In 1996, in a brief but prescient passage identifying the
emerging conservative narrative of civil rights, Gordon foresaw this problem:
“One usually expects of conservative narratives a feeling for the sheer weight
of history, the slowness to respond to efforts to cut across accumulated custom,

27. Id. at 2625 (majority opinion) (first alteration in original) (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer,

Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577, 577 (codified at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301 app. at 8 (2016))).
28. Id. at 2626.
29. In the context of LGBT rights, at least in the realm of marriage equality, the liberal
progress metanarrative remains a live and effective resource for legal argument. See,
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593-95 (2015) (discussing how “[t]he history
of marriage” has involved “both continuity and change”).
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the gradual nature of evolutionary change.”30 The conservative objection to
Brown v. Board of Education, after all, had been precisely the idea “that longembedded social customs could not be altered overnight through legislation
and court orders.”31 Yet in more recent conservative accounts, Gordon
continued, “the weight of history disappears almost entirely” as the civil rights
legislation of the 1960s is now “supposed to have achieved its purposes of
equalizing opportunity almost from the moment of its enactment.”32 In the
years since Gordon made this observation, this incongruous oblivion to “the
weight of history” has only gained in legal power. It’s a testament to Gordon’s
acuity that we can so readily use his 1990s lectures to help make sense of the
Roberts Court, even as recent cases around the country also seem to be
rescrambling the political valence of some of the tropes Gordon identified.

30. GORDON, Histories of Liberal Society, supra note 15, at 348.
31. See id. (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
32. Id.
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